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NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff, as purchaser under a standard form earnest 
money receipt and offer to purchase (hereinafter the "Agree-
ment"), commenced this action against Defendants, as sellers 
under the Agreement, seeking to compel the Defendants to convey 
to Plaintiff title to certain improved real property (herein-
after sometimes the "Property") purchased by Plaintiff from 
Defendants under and described in the Agreement. In addition, 
Plaintiff requested the Trial Court to remove certain encum-
brances on the Property within a time certain and upon failure 
of Defendants to do so, then, in the alternative, to offset 
the monetary amount of such encumbrances against the balance 
of the purchase price owed by Plaintiff to Defendants. 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
The Trial Court concluded that the Agreement was 
too vague and ambiguous to be binding upon Defendants and, 
therefore, not capable of specific performance. The Trial 
Court entered judgment dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint and 
ordering Defendants to return to Plaintiff the $500.00 consider-
ation paid by him to Defendants at the time of execution of the 
Agreement. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks an order reversing the judgment of 
the Trial Court and directing entry of judgment for Plaintiff 
compelling Defendants to convey title to the Property to 
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Plaintiff and requiring Defendants within a time certain to 
remove certain encumbrances on the Property. In addition, 
Plaintiff requests that upon Defendants failure to do so, then, 
in the alternative, to allow offset of the monetary amount of 
the encumbrances against the balance of the purchase price 
owed by Plaintiff to Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the spring of 1976, Plaintiff was contacted 
by Richard Lambert (hereinafter "Lambert"), a real estate agent 
acting as agent for Defendants and a loan officer at Zions 
First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter "Zions 
Bank"), regarding the sale of certain real property located 
at the intersection of Hillview Drive and Ninth East Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. Lambert informed Plaintiff that 
Defendants would be in the process of constructing three four-
plex units on such property and that he, Lambert, was attempting 
to arrange a sale to Plaintiff on behalf of Defendants of 
one of the fourplex units (sometimes hereinafter the term 
"fourplex" is used to describe the property purchased by 
Plaintiff under the Agreement) • 
On or about April 23, 1976, Lambert presented Plain-
tiff with the Agreement (Exhibit 1.) which he had prepared 
as agent for Defendants (R. 56). The Agreement provided, 
among other things, for (i) the sale of real property situated 
at "the corner of Hillview and Ninth East", Salt Lake City, 
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Utah, and (ii) a $500.00 deposit was to be paid and held for 
application toward payment of a $70,000 total purchase price. 
The Agreement also included the words "terms to be arranged", 
which terms, according to the Agreement and understanding 
thereof by Plaintiff, Defendants and Lambert, meant that 
Plaintiff was to arrange his own permanent financing of the 
Property and with that financing to pay the Defendants the 
balance due at the closing of title. Defendants paid Lambert 
a commission for arranging this sale of the Property to Plain-
tiff (R. 68-69). 
Within approximately two or three weeks after the 
execution date of the Agreement, Plaintiff sought financing 
from Zions Bank for a loan in an amount of eighty percent (80%) 
of the purchase price of the Property and received a commitment 
from Zions Bank for that financing (R. 58). Based solely upon 
Plaintiff's financing commitment from Zions Bank, Defendants 
received from Zions Bank a loan for the construction of a four-
plex on the Property (R. 103, 104 and Exhibit 16). 
No completion date for construction of the fourplex 
on Plaintiff's Property was inserted into the Agreement at 
the instruction of Defendant Michael Alvey to Lambert. Lambert 
was told that the fourplex could be completed on Plaintiff's 
Property within three months of the execution date of the 
Agreement, but since it might take as long as four months to 
complete, he should not put a completion date in the Agreement 
-3-
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(R. 123, 127). Notwithstanding the fact that the fourplex 
was to have been completed on Plaintiff's Property within three 
or four months and title closed after April 23, 1976, Plaintiff 
received no communications from Defendants until after March 23, 
1977. However, during the period from April 23, 1976 to 
March 23, 1977, Plaintiff continuously observed the construction 
of the fourplex unit on his Property. On numerous occasions 
Plaintiff complained to Lambert regarding Defendants' dilatory 
construction of such fourplex. 
On March 23, 1977, Plaintiff received a letter 
bearing that date and advising him that the fourplex unit 
being built on the Property would be ready to close within two 
or three weeks. Such letter requested that Plaintiff deposit 
$13,500 in a non-interest bearing escrow account at Zions 
Bank as a downpayment for his fourplex unit. Plaintiff had 
not theretofore been advised that such a deposit would be 
required and it was Plaintiff's understanding that such $13,500 
was due and payable at closing of title to the Property. After 
repeated unsuccessful attempts by Plaintiff to communicate 
with Defendants to determine the basis upon which such deposit 
was being requested by Defendants, Plaintiff learned that such 
deposit was to evidence his financial ability to complete the 
closing of title to his Property. Despite Plaintiff's dis-
agreement with Defendants' demand for such deposit, and in 
anticipation of the purchase and sale of the Property being 
-4-
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closed within two or three weeks of March 23, 1977, Plaintiff 
did deposit $13,500 with Zions Bank on April 8, 1977-(R. 59-61). 
From April 8, 1977 to approximately May 20, 1977, 
Plaintiff drove by his Property not less than once a week and 
observed that the fourplex unit being constructed on his 
Property was not complete and ready for rental and closing of 
title, and very little, if any work, was being done in order 
to complete construction. On or about May 20, 1977, Plaintiff 
withdrew the $13,500 sum from the escrow account, not because 
he did not intend to complete purchase of the fourplex unit, 
but rather because of the construction delays on Defendants' 
part, his inability to contact Defendants and the fact that 
the funds were in a non-interest bearing account (R.62). 
After more unsuccessful attempts to communicate 
with Defendants, Plaintiff brought this action for specific 
performance by Defendants of the terms to be performed by the 
Agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
The Trial Court concluded that: 
1. The Agreement was "vague, ambiguous, uncerl:ain, 
contingent and incomplete on its face, and ••• not capable 
of specific performance" (R.42) because no specific fourplex 
was agreed upon by Plaintiff and Defendants and because the 
phrase in the Agreement of "terms to be arranged" was not 
-5-
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discussed, negotiated or agreed to, but was left to future 
agreement" (R. 41, 42). 
2. The Plaintiff failed to establish a valid 
legally enforceable contract because he had not complied with 
its terms by performing or offering to perform the obligations 
to be performed by him under the Agreement (R.42). This 
conclusion was based upon the Court's findings that Plaintiff 
had never obtained financing for the purchase of the Property 
and had never tendered to Defendants the purchase price 
thereof (R. 42). 
It is submitted that the Court erred in its 
Findings and Conclusions and that it is the prerogative and 
the duty of this Court in an action in equity such as this to 
review the law and the facts and to make its own findings, 
substituting its judgment for that of the Trial Court if that 
judgment is not supported by the evidence. UTAH CONST. Art. 
VII §9; Del Porto ~· Nicolo, 495 P.2d 811, 812 (Utah 1972); 
Nokes ~· Continental Min. & Mill, 308 P.2d 954, 955 (Utah 
1957); Crocket v. Nish, 147 P.2d 853, 854 (Utah 1944). 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS VAGUE 
AND AMBIGUOUS AND NOT CAPABLE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IN THAT 
THE FOURPLEX TO BE SOLD TO PLAINTIFF WAS IDENTIFIED AND THE 
PARTIES KNEW, UNDERSTOOD AND HAD AGREED AS TO THE MEANING OF 
THE PHRASE "TERMS TO BE ARRANGED". 
A fundamental rule of contract construction is that 
the terms of the agreement or contract in question must be 
-6-
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construed realistically in light of circumstances under which 
it was entered into and that if the intent of the parties can 
be ascertained with reasonable certainty, the Agreement must 
be given effect despite the uncertainty of the language of the 
Agreement. 
This Court has adhered to this principle in several of 
its recent decisions. In Kier ~· Condrack, 478 P.2d 327 (Utah 
1970) an action was brought for specific performance of a contract 
to sell real property. This Court held that where the contract 
is uncertain "the Trial Court could then look to the circum-
stances and testimony of the parties to ascertain what appeared 
to be their intent and determine their obligations based 
thereon." Id. at 329. 
In Continental Bank and Trust Co. ~· ~· ~· Stewart, 
291 P.2d 890 (Utah 1955), a bank, as a third party beneficiary, 
brought an action against the purchaser of property based on 
the purchaser's agreement to pay to the bank the debts of the 
seller. The earnest money receipt by which the purchaser had 
agreed to acquire the real property did not state what debts 
were to be paid by the purchaser or the time and manner of 
payment. In view of these ambiguities, this Court held that it 
was proper for the trial court to consider "the situation of 
the parties, the facts and circumstances surrounding the making 
of the contract, the purpose of its execution and the respective 
claims thereunder to ascertain what the parties intended. Id. 
at 892. 
-7-
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From these decisions it is apparent that an agreement 
which is vague and uncertain on its fact cannot be denied effect 
where the meaning of the agreement or contract can be ascertained 
from the circumstances surrounding its negotiation, execution 
and the parties'conduct with respect thereto. The Agreement 
specifies the amount of the earnest money deposit, the total 
purchase price of the Property, and the names of the contracting 
parties. The identity of the fourplex unit to be purchased 
by Plaintiff and the meaning of the phrase "terms to be arranged" 
become unequivocal and unambiguous by an analysis of circum-
stances surrounding negotiations, execution of the Agreement and 
the parties' conduct, as shown by the pleadings on file in this 
case and the evidence introduced at trial. 
A. Identity of Fourplex 
At the time Plaintiff was contacted by Lambert as 
agent for Defendants regarding the purchase of the fourplex, 
Defendants were engaged in negotiations to obtain a parcel of 
real property extending eastward from the corner of Ninth East 
Street and Hillview. Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendants 
obtained such parcel and the lots therein contained were sold 
to three purchasers by Lambert pursuant to three similar 
earnest money agreements (R. 93-98, 114-118). Plaintiff was 
one of such three purchasers. At the time the three earnest 
money agreements were executed, a decision had not been made 
by Defendants with respect to identifying each of the three 
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lots to specified buyers (R. 97, 118). Defendants, however, 
did not rely on that fact as a basis for refusing to perform its 
earnest money agreements with the two buyers other than 
Plaintiff (R. 97) • Any uncertainty in the property descriptions 
did not present an obstacle to the consummation and closing 
of the transactions with the other two buyers, and Defendants' 
conduct in connection therewith actually established and 
eliminated any question as to the identity of the fourplex to 
be purchased by Plaintiff; namely, as a result of the consumma-
tion of the transactions with the other two buyers, there was 
only one lot and fourplex remaining for Plaintiff to purchase. 
It is anomalous under these circumstances, especially 
after Defendants have admitted in their answer to entering 
into the Agreement with Plaintiff (R. 9), that Defendants now 
contend for the first time that there exists an uncertainty 
with respect to the identity of the fourplex to be purchased 
by Plaintiff. Further, Defendant Michael Alvey testified at 
trial that there was no question that one of the fourplexes was 
to be sold to Plaintiff (R. 98). Such testimony of Michael 
Alvey, together with the foregoing facts, and the conduct of 
Defendants, unequivocally shows that Defendants' refusal to 
perform their part of the Agreement is not due to any confusion 
or ambiguity with respect to the identity of the Property, but 
is simply a specious excuse attempting to justify their refusal 
to perform and their breach of the Agreement. 
-9-
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B. Terms to be Arranged 
The circumstances surrounding execution of the Agree-
ment also dispel any contention that the Agreement is uncertain 
with respect to the manner of payment. The literal language 
of the Agreement provided that the financing terms were to be 
arranged. The phrase "terms to be arranged" referred to 
Plaintiff's arrangements to obtain permanent financing of the 
fourplex. such phrase in no manner whatsoever pertained to any 
arrangements or agreements between Plaintiff and Defendants. 
Plaintiff and Lambert, who was also a loan officer 
with Zions Bank, discussed the terms of the permanent financing 
prior to the execution of the Agreement by Plaintiff. Lambert 
informed Plaintiff of the terms he thought would be available 
from Zions Bank based on Plaintiff's financial statement (R. 57). 
After this discussion, Lambert presented the Agreement to 
Defendant Michael Alvey for execution by Defendants. Lambert 
informed Defendants that the Plaintiff was going to arrange his 
own financing with Zions Bank and pay Defendants the full balance 
of the purchase price at the closing of title to the fourplex. 
Defendants did not object to this financing arrangement with 
Zions Bank (R. 123). As further evidence of this understanding, 
Plaintiff applied to Zions Bank for a loan of 80% of the 
purchase price of the fourplex. Such loan would have been 
closed at the same time the construction of the fourplex was 
projected to be completed. Such action on Plaintiff's part 
-10-
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regarding application for and approval of such financing is 
substantiated by his own testimony (R. 58), the testimony 
of Douglas Giver, a former loan officer with Zions Bank (R. 
164, 165), the records of Zions Bank indicating application for 
such a loan, and the fact that the application had been 
presented to Zions Bank loan committee (R. 104 and Exhibit 
16). 
The Trial Court's conclusion that the phrase "terms 
to be arranged" was left to future agreement is clearly 
erroneous with proper understanding of certain facts. The 
evidence has established that Plaintiff's loan application had 
to be approved by Zions Bank as a condition precedent to Zions 
Bank granting a construction loan to Defendants to build Plain-
tiff's fourplex (R. 103, 104 and Exhibits 8, 9, 10 and 15). 
Therefore, the approval by Zions Bank of the construction loan 
regarding Plaintiff's fourplex removes all doubt, if indeed 
any was present, regarding the meaning of the phrase "terms 
to be arranged". Such phrase was not intended to and did not 
in fact have any application to Plaintiff's and Defendants' 
application. 
The evidence of discussions between Plaintiff and 
Lambert, Defendants and Lambert, and the approval of loans 
by Zions Bank for Defendants and Plaintiff, established that 
Defendants did not consider any part of the Agreement to be 
ambiguous. All major aspects of the Agreement are clear and 
-11-
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unambiguous. Clearly, the position of Defendants is to take 
advantage of the provisions of the Agreement prepared by their 
agent Lambert because, among other reasons, Defendants had 
encumbered the Property in addition to the construction loan 
at Zions Bank for $55,000, for an additional $60,750 (R. 84, 
85 and Exhibit 6). 
A similar challenge to an agreement uncertain on its 
face was rejected by this Court in Kier ~· Condra~ supra. 
The agreement under review in that case provided for payment 
of the price for purchase of realty upon "terms to be negoti-
ated." Id. at 329. This Court, however, agreed with the trial 
court's view that "when the parties had reached an agreement 
and committed themselves on the major aspects of the transaction, 
that is, that defendants would sell and the plaintiff would buy 
at the agreed price of $23,500 • reserving only the 'terms' 
of payment, they should be obliged to act in good faith in 
keeping their promises ••• But neither party should be per-
mitted to use the reservation of 'terms' to get more than they 
had promised • • • nor to renege on the bargain 
As shown, the Kier case is similar on its facts to 
this case on appeal. In Kier, this Court determined that the 
parties had committed themselves on the major aspects of the 
transaction: that the defendants would sell, that the plaintiff 
would buy at the agreed price of $23,500. In this case we have 
an agreement definite as to each of those aspects. Defendants 
-12-
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admittedly agreed to sell and Plaintiff agreed to purchase the 
fourplex at a price of $70,000. In Kier, the terms of payment 
were alleged to be indefinite and unenforceable. The $23,500 
purchase price was to be "(O)n payment and terms to be 
negotiated • • Id. at 32~. In this case the purchase price 
was to be financed upon "terms to be arranged". Despite the 
Kier case, and the facts in this case, the Trial Court con-
eluded that there existed uncertainty and held the Agreement 
incapable of specific performance. Clearly, the Trial Court 
erred in this conclusion because the application of the Kier 
rationale to the facts in this case require the inseparable 
conclusion that the major aspects of the Agreement had been 
agreed upon, and the circumstances surrounding the execution 
of the Agreement, including the parties' conduct with respect 
to the Agreement, unequivocally and unambiguously identify each 
and every term of the Agreement. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF HAD FAILED TO COMPLY 
WITH THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT BY NOT OBTAINING NECESSARY 
FINANCING OR NOT TENDERING THE PURCHASE PRICE. 
The record clearly shows that Plaintiff complied in 
every respect with all obligations on his part to be performed 
and all requests made upon him by Defendants. Also, Plaintiff 
made any and all tenders of performance required by the Agree-
ment or by law. 
Plaintiff signed the Agreement, delivered the sum 
-13-
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of $500,00 to Lambert as a deposit on the purchase price, and 
contrary to his understanding of the Agreement, he complied 
with Defendants' request to deposit $13,500 in a non-interest 
bearing escrow account with Zions Bank. He also applied to 
Zions Bank for financing for the balance of the purchase price 
and was told that he had qualified for the financing (R. 75). 
Defendants produced no evidence that Plaintiff at any time was 
not ready, willing and able to perform or could not in fact 
have tendered and paid the purchase price of the fourplex. 
The general rule in equity regarding the tender of 
performance is that even though the plaintiff has not tendered 
performance, the court can decree specific performance by 
the defendant by making enforcement conditional upon plaintiff's 
rendering the return performance into court. Equitable 
principles do not require that the plaintiff must of necessity 
make a tender before suing for specific performance, so long 
as plaintiff is ready, willing and able to tender performance. 
The court of equity suffered from no such 
limitation of power (as compared to courts of law). 
It could decree specific performance by the defendant, 
and at the same time make enforcement conditional on 
the plaintiff's rendering the return performance into 
court (e.g. the payment of a price in money or the 
delivery of a deed). If the plaintiff's performance 
was one that required some continued performance 
incapable of being rendered into court, the decree 
might require specific performance either after full 
performance by the plaintiff or by requiring it pari 
passu as the plaintiff's performance proceeded. In 
many fewer cases does justice require that the plain-
tiff should make a tender before suing for specific 
performance; and therefore tender is much less often 
held to be a condition precedent to the granting of 
a decree. 
-14-
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SA Corbin on Contracts, §1175, P. 299. 
The only evidence available to Defendant that Plaintiff 
did not comply with all of Defendants' requests or which tends 
to indicate that he did not intend to perform his obligations 
under the Agreement is that he withdrew the $13,500 from the 
escrow account at Zions Bank after having deposited the same. 
However, Appellan± asserts that such escrow arrangement is not 
part of the Agreement. Assuming, arguendo, that such escrow 
arrangement is a term of the Agreement, such action of with-
drawing the funds is explainable and was explained at trial. 
When the fourplex was not near completion at the time projected 
in Defendants' letter to Plaintiff of March 23, 1977 (R. 61, 62) 
and because the money was in a non-interest bearing escrow 
account, Plaintiff withdrew the same. By doing so, Plaintiff 
did not intend to breach the Agreement or to not complete it 
as required by him. Instead, Plaintiff testified his action 
was prompted by the combination of factors of Defendants long 
delays in completion of the fourplex and the fact that such a 
large sum of money was in a non-interest bearing escrow account. 
In addition, Plaintiff profferred testimony at trial that he 
had been informed by an employee at Zions Bank that Defendants, 
without Plaintiff's permission or knowledge, had attempted to 
remove the $13,500 from the escrow account prior to having 
finished the construction of Plaintiff's fourplex and the closing 
of title thereto. Such testimony was excluded by the Trial 
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court, however, and it is unclear whether the exclusion was on 
the basis that such profferred testimony was hearsay or 
whether an inadequate foundation had been laid for its acceptance, 
If excluded on the basis of hearsay, such exclusion was improper 
in that the testimony, as stated at the time (R. 63), was not 
being introduced for the truth of the matter asserted but simply 
to show another reason why Plaintiff was withdrawing his funds 
from the escrow account, and not being introduced for the truth 
of the matter asserted, the testimony would obviously not be 
hearsay. In the event the testimony was excluded on grounds of 
lack of a proper foundation, it is submitted that a proper 
foundation was laid, or in any event, Defendants' counsel 
failed to state the grounds upon which he based his objection of 
lack of foundation. The profferred testimony should have been 
received. 
Contrary to the finding of the Trial Court that 
Plaintiff has not complied with the terms of the Agreement by 
obtaining financing or tendering the purchase price, the testi-
mony as reviewed and analyzed clearly shows that Plaintiff 
has performed and has always been ready, willing and able to 
perform the obligations required of him under the Agreement. 
It has been Defendants who failed to perform. Notwithstanding 
Defendants' own statements, as testified to by their agent 
Lambert (R. 123), that Plaintiff's fourplex would be completed 
within three to four months, it was eleven months before 
-16-
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Defendants notified Plaintiff that his fourplex unit would 
be completed in two to three weeks after date of that notifi-
cation; namely, March 23, 1977. Furthermore, the Plaintiff's 
fourplex was still not completed within that two to three week 
period and remained uncompleted as long as five to six weeks 
after March 23, 1977 (R. 61, 62). Also, without any basis in 
the Agreement, Defendants required Plaintiff to deposit 
$13,500 in a non-interest bearing escrow account as evidence 
of his ability to perform. But Defendants failed to perform 
their part of the Agreement by not timely completing Plaintiff's 
fourplex. Despite Defendants' utter lack of good faith in not 
performing their obligations under the Agreement, Defendants 
nevertheless raised defenses as to vagueness of the Agreement 
and lack of performance on Plaintiff's part. Proper application 
of equitable principles to the facts of this case requires 
and compels specific performance of the Agreement, as was 
recognized by this Court in the Kier case. 
We recognize the validity of the rule relied upon by 
Defendants that to be enforceable a contract must be 
sufficiently definite in its terms that the parties 
know what is required of them. But like all rules, 
which are necessarily stated in generality, it is 
only applicable in the proper circumstances, where 
the justice of the case requires: as a shield to 
protect the party from injustice, and not as a weapon 
under which to perpetrate an injustice. 
Kier ~· Condrack, supra, at 330. To uphold the Defendants' 
position in this case will allow them to use legal principles 
as a "sword" to perpetrate an injustice upon Plaintiff. The 
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facts of this case compel that Plaintiff be protected and 
shielded against the kind of activities Defendants and their 
agent Lambert have perpetrated upon him and equitable principles 
demand the same. 
CONCLUSION 
The precedent upon which to decide this case is found 
in the holdings of Kier ~· Condrack, supra, and Continental 
Bank ~ Trust Company ~· Stuart, supra, Id. at 892. It is, 
therefore, not only proper but obligatory to consider the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the Agreement 
and the negotiation and actions of the Plaintiff and Defendants. 
When such matters are considered, it is unequivocal that a 
specific fourplex does exist and that not only was it the intent 
of the Plaintiff and Defendants that such fourplex be the one 
purchased by Plaintiff, but also it is the only fourplex that 
could be the subject of the Agreement. It is also unequivocal 
that Plaintiff, Defendants and Lambert all were aware and 
contemplated that the balance of the purchase price of the four-
plex would be paid by Plaintiff at closing to title thereto 
with funds he arranged by his own financing efforts. Defen-
dants admitted the Agreement in their answer. Defendants' 
activities and conduct with respect to the Agreement for a 
period in excess of a year indicates knowledge and intention 
on their part that an Agreement existed under which they were 
to sell a specific fourplex to Plaintiff to be totally paid for 
by Plaintiff at closing. The Court, if it does not enforce the 
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Agreement, would be allowing Defendants to use the defenses 
raises by them as a weapon to thwart justice and fair dealings 
rather than as a shield to prevent injustice as equitable 
principles were intended to be used. 
It is hereby requested that the Court should not let 
stand the decree of the Trial Court that will allow Defendants, 
who abruptly, without notice and to the detriment of Plaintiff 
who had justifiably relied on the Agreement and Defendants' 
conduct, refuse to abide by and specifically perform their 
obligations under the Agreement. The judgment of the Trial 
court should be reversed and Defendants ordered to specifically 
perform the Agreement by conveying the Property to Plaintiff, 
and that if the encumbrances on the Property as shown in the 
record are not removed by Defendants within a reasonable time 
specified by the Court, Plaintiff be allowed an offset in the 
total amount of such encumbrances against the balance of the 
purchase price of the Property to be paid by him to Defendants. 
DATED February 9, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted: 
PARSONS & CROWTHER 
By~~-.,,._ 
~nn Parsons 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Two copies of the foregoing brief were served upon 
Defendants by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to their 
attorney, Harold A. Hinsey, at 2000 Beneficial Life Tower, 
36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 9th 
day of February, 1979. 
~~4~ 
Thomas N. crowhei 
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